Dear editors,
If “it’s all about sex,” what is sex about? The question is a Mad Libs litmus test: liberation or patriarchy, hedonistic pleasure or spiritual union, fucking or making love.
Common answers fall into the fallacy of means-ends methodology. They confuse the means of sex with its ends, outcomes that are common but noncontingent, thereby failing to name what it really is. The fault lies in the structure of our proposition. Saying “__ is about __” implicitly displaces an object from itself; we begin to speak of something else, not sex.
In attempting to avoid such a confusion of classification, some philosophers have ventured to make a more precise diagnosis. For instance, sexual desire is defined by Alan H. Goldman as “desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfill such desire of the agent.” Put crudely, sex is about sex.
A definition like this may be valid and sound, but it can hardly be wielded. Its sterile accuracy elides personal obstacles and resists use. We ask what sex is about because we have skin in the game. “Sex is about sex” may still be a useful retooling, but a better description cannot intervene only in the syntax of the statement—we must plumb the word itself.
Let’s set sex aside for a moment, then, and speak of blackberries. So begins Robert Hass in his poem “Meditation at Lagunitas,” a reflective elegy that deals, in its first lines, with speech: “There is in this world no one thing / to which the bramble of blackberry corresponds.” At “blackberry,” readers conjure a cacophony of things, alike only in fuzzy approximation. Words cannot signal the same thing in separate minds. Expression is a series of mismatches. “Talking this way, everything dissolves,” Hass says, and begins to list everything that does: “justice, / pine, hair”…
…“woman, you and I. There was a woman / I made love to.” The volta comes mid-count, and the poem is now about sex. These two acts interlock. Speech pushes the internal outside and sex, in any position, takes the external in. The pursuit of mutual meaning, flippant in everyday speech, becomes fraught. Intercourse, after all, corresponds to both. If we can’t reach a single, shared significance for a piece of fruit, much less for sex, are we—for lack of a better word—screwed?
No (or yes, depending on one’s read of it). In her essay “Only Mercy: Sex After Consent,” critic Becca Rothfeld proposes that “there is so little vocabulary for the peculiar rapture these encounters occasion.” Sex is a domain of “maddening illegibility” with “no established idiom.” In sex as in speech—particularly the speech that constitutes poetry—meaning is inextricable from form. If it were enough to say what sex is about, there would be no need to do it.
The resistance to verbal packaging is constitutive, not coincidental, to sex, and it is not a position of futility but of action. Bad sex, like bad poetry, is cliché. It is an aesthetic transgression to flatten an individual’s particulars into generality. It is also an ethical one, analogous to slotting one’s partner into social roles determined by the politics that permeate bedrooms.
Our only hope for good sex, in both senses of the word, is to leave it indeterminate. Not to reject the descriptive project, but to insist that it continues. To say, and keep saying: “blackberry, blackberry, blackberry.”
Rapturously,
Emily Sun
Image: Alfred Stieglitz, Georgia O’Keeffe—Hands and Thimble, palladium print, 1919 (Art Institute of Chicago, Illinois).
